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Abstract
Recent studies using data on social media and stock markets have mainly focused
on predicting stock returns. Instead of predicting stock price movements, we
examine the relation between Facebook data and investors’ decision making
in stock markets with a unique data on investors’ transactions on Nokia. We
find that the decisions to buy versus sell are associated with Facebook data
especially for passive households and also for nonprofit organizations. At the
same time, it seems that more sophisticated investors—financial and insurance
institutions—are behaving independently from Facebook activities.
Keywords: Investor behavior, Social media, Stock markets, Investor
sophistication, Decision making
JEL classification: G10, G11
1. Introduction
Social media sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, create various oppor-
tunities for companies to improve their internal and external communications
and to collaborate and communicate with their customers, partners, and other
stakeholders, such as investors. Given the importance of social media in exter-
nal communications, it is not surprising that social media data have been used
recently to predict real-world outcomes (see e.g. Asur and Huberman, 2010).
In the financial market research, numerous scholars have used Facebook data
(Karabulut, 2013; Siganos et al., 2014; Bukovina et al., 2015) and data from
other social media sites (Bollen et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2011; Zheludev et al.,
2014; Chen et al., 2014; Nofer and Hinz, 2015; Zhang et al., 2017; You et al.,
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2017).1 The primary aim of such research has been to predict market-wide
stock movements, yet there is scant research on how social media data relate to
the behavior of individual investors, perhaps because of the lack of availability
of investor account level data.
In this paper, we examine the extent to which investors’ trading decisions are
driven by Facebook posts and activity. To this end, we use a unique investor-
level shareholding registration data set that includes the trading of all Finnish
investors over multiple years. In particular, given that an investor trades, we
study how Facebook data relate to investors’ decisions to increase or decrease
their positions. This question is addressed for different investor groups, includ-
ing financial institutions, nonprofit organizations, and households, and their
trades in Nokia stock. As Nokia was one of the most liquid stocks on the
Finnish stock market, this unique data has been studied in several articles,2
and here we combine it with social media data. Paper by Lillo et al. (2015) is
the most closely related study to ours. It also investigates the trading behavior
of different investor groups with Nokia stock, but with Thomson Reuters news
articles—which are not social media data per se.
Currently, Facebook is clearly the most widely used social media platform,
with 2.2 billion monthly active users worldwide (Statista, 2018). As of January
2013, social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter are used by about 45%
of S&P1500 firms to communicate externally formal and informal information
about their business (Jung et al., 2017). Specifically, companies communicate
both corporate disclosures and other information via social media (Zhou et al.,
2014). Yang et al. (2017) show that social media, and mass media in general,
influences investor’s trading decisions. Snow and Rasso (2017) argue that less
sophisticated investors potentially benefit most from disclosures communicated
via social media, because, on social media platforms, the information is essen-
tially “pushed” to them, which makes this information easier to access. In
addition, Snow and Rasso (2017) show that less sophisticated investors process
financial information received from social media differently from information
received via company’s investor relations website.
It is important to remember that typically companies use official exchange-
routed company announcements as a primary communication channel (see e.g.
Jung et al., 2017), followed by other channels, including newspapers and social
media.3 Additionally, communicating information via social media is volun-
tary, while some company announcement releases are mandatory. Furthermore,
Jung et al. (2017) show that companies disseminate strategically, i.e. companies
are less likely to disseminate information in Twitter when the news is bad. In
this regard, we wish to determine how the investment decisions of, for example,
1See also Bukovina (2016) for an overview of research related to a link between social media
and capital markets
2See for example Westerholm (2009); Tumminello et al. (2012); Lillo et al. (2015);
Ranganathan et al. (2017)
3See Siikanen et al. (2017b,a), and references therein, for effects of company announcements
in stock markets.
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less sophisticated and professional investors, among other investor groups, cor-
relate with potentially biased Facebook information. We also note that the rela-
tionship between Facebook data and trading can also be related to the attention
grabbing behavior of investors, especially households (see Barber and Odean,
2007).
2. Data
2.1. Shareholding Registration Record Data
To identify the trading of different investor categories, we use shareholding
registration record data including all domestic investors from June 7, 2010 to
the end of 2016, obtained from Euroclear Ltd.4 Each record in the data contains
detailed information about the investor and the change in his/her holdings. Dur-
ing our analysis period, 282,269 distinct Finnish investors traded Nokia stock.
We divide them into five groups according to their sector codes: nonfinancial
corporations, financial and insurance corporations, general governmental or-
ganizations, nonprofit organizations, and households. Household investors are
further divided into four investor activity groups. Investor’s activity group is
defined by the number of days the investor traded during the past eight weeks,
including the analyzed week. If the number of active days in the past 8 weeks
is equal to 1, the investor is considered inactive; if it is between 2 and 5, the in-
vestor is passive; 6–20 means moderate; and 21–40 means active. Notably, this
is a dynamic group, as one investor might appear in several groups throughout
the analysis period.
For the purposes of our analysis, we calculate the number of investors in
each group who changed their holdings during a week and the number of in-
vestors who increased their holdings (bought more than sold) during that week.
Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics of the investor groups and their weekly
trading in our data sample. We see that financial and governmental institutions
are on average most active sector groups, where as households and nonprofit
organizations are least active.
2.2. Facebook Data
We collect daily numbers of posts and related comments, likes, and shares
from Nokia’s Facebook wall5 between June 2010 and December 2016 using the
4Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000, 2001); Tumminello et al. (2012); Lillo et al. (2015);
Baltakys et al. (2018) use data sets from the same source, and provide descriptions of the
data. However, they use data from before 2009, when all transactions were reported sepa-
rately with exact trading dates. After moving to Central Counterparty Clearing in late 2009,
the Euroclear research data set contains only aggregated daily trades without specifying the
actual trading dates—instead a registration date is reported for each record. Thus, we reverse
engineer the trading dates from the registration dates. We use the official T+3 settlement
convention for data before and on October 8, 2014 and T+2 afterwards (see Euroclear, 2014).
Using the derived trading dates, we aggregate transactions on a weekly basis, and this reduced
the possible noise of inaccurate trading date derivation.
5https://www.facebook.com/nokia
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics on investor groups. N gives the total number of investors
per group. Mean, median and standard deviation (st.Dev) relate to the weekly observations
on numbers of investors in each group that changed their net holdings during a week. In Panel
B, household investors are categorized into activeness groups on the basis of their trading in
the past eight weeks (40 trading days).
Panel A: Investor categories
Sector N Mean (%of all) Median st.Dev
Companies 12,213 271 (2.2%) 230 166
Financial 427 28 (6.6%) 27 9
Governmental 89 7 (7.9%) 7 4
Nonprofit 1,177 18 (1.5%) 16 12
Households 268,363 4,640 (1.7%) 3,694 3,179
Total 282,269
Panel B: Activity groups of household investors
Activeness; # of active days N Mean (%of all) Median st.Dev
Active; (20, 40] 1,228 54 (4.4%) 51 22
Moderate; (5, 20] 16,019 502 (3.1%) 450 227
Passive; (1, 5] 120,906 1,856 (1.5%) 1,402 1,422
Inactive; 1 264,942 2,228 (0.8%) 1,670 1,897
Social Data Analytics Tool (SODATO) (see Hussain et al., 2014; Hussain and Vatrapu,
2014a,b). The comments, likes, and shares are always related to a specific post,
i.e. the post is the main action. Therefore, we assign the numbers of comments,
likes, and shares to the date of the original post—that is, not the date when the
actual comment, like, or share was made. In effect, the numbers of comments,
likes, and shares quantify the attention the posts released on a particular day
received.
We aggregate the daily Facebook data to weekly by summing the numbers of
posts, comments, likes, and shares during a week. We take the week beginning
on Saturday and ending on Friday, since trading does not occur on weekends.
This way, we relate the Facebook activity on weekends to the week in which they
can actually affect investors’ trading decisions. In total, our sample comprises
of 342 weekly observations for posts, comments, likes, and shares. Table 2 gives
descriptive statistics of these time series. We can see that on average, there is
more than one post made per day, and calculate that one post got on average
274 comments, 4,379 likes, and 7 shares.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on Facebook data. N gives the total number of each
Facebook activity in our sample. Mean, median and standard deviation (st.Dev) relate to the
weekly observations on numbers of each Facebook activity.
Activity N Mean Median st.Dev
Post 2,906 8 8 6
Comment 797,586 2,332 1,585 2,808
Like 12,725,171 37,208 11,977 43,500
Share 919,380 2,688 461 4,525
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2.3. Company announcement data
The announcement data is collected from NASDAQ OMX Nordic’s website.6
The data set includes all the announcements that Nokia filed with Nasdaq be-
tween June 2010 and December 2016. Altogether, we have 507 company an-
nouncements in the sample. We aggregate the announcement data into weekly
by summing the number of announcements from Saturday to Friday, i.e. in
similar way as the Facebook data. In the regressions, we use a dummy variable
to indicate whether there was at least one announcement release during a week.
Our sample includes 187 weeks with at least one announcement release (out of
total 342 weeks).
2.4. Weekly return data
The daily adjusted closing price data used to calculate the returns is collected
from NASDAQ OMX Nordic’s website.7 For each week, we calculate the log
return as Rett = ln [Pt/Pt−1], where Pt is the closing price from the last trading
day on the week (usually Friday), and Pt−1 is the closing price from last trading
day on the previous week t − 1 (usually previous week’s Friday). The average
weekly return for Nokia during the sample period was –0.16%.
3. Framework of the empirical analysis
Our analysis is based on logistic regressions to explain how Facebook activity
relates to an increase versus a decrease in Nokia shares in investors’ portfolios.8
To identify the groups of investors whose trading behavior is related to Facebook
data, we run separate regressions for each investor group with each Facebook
variable.
The dependent variable in our regressions is a dummy variable with value
1 if an investor increased his/her holdings in Nokia stock during a given week
(bought more than sold) and 0 if the investor decreased the holdings (Dincreasedt ).
In a given week, only investors whose net position for Nokia changed are in-
cluded. The explanatory variable of main interest is the number of posts, com-
ments, likes, or shares depending on the regression (FB). We control for company
announcement releases with company announcement dummy (NEWSt), which
is 1 if there was an announcement released during week t and 0 otherwise.
6http://www.nasdaqomxnordic.com/news/companynews, see the page also for detailed in-
formation.
7http://www.nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares/microsite?Instrument=HEX24311.
8Another option would be (instead of restricting the analysis to a binary outcome) to use
linear regressions with continuous dependent variable (i.e. how much an investor changed
the position). However, in order to use continuous dependent variable, proportional changes
in investors’ positions would have to be calculated, which, in turn, requires information on
investors’ holdings. In contrast to changes in holdings, the levels of holdings, however, were
not accurately available. The use of “changes in holdings” as a non-proportional variable
is problematic, because investors are trading by very different amounts of shares. These
problems are addressed by using logistic regression.
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Additionally, we use the number of investors in the group who increased their
holdings during the previous week scaled by the total number of investors who
changed their holdings during the previous week. This is depicted as follows:
scDincreasedt−1 =
1
nt−1
nt−1∑
i=1
Dincreasedi,t−1
where nt−1 is the number of investors who changed (increased or decreased)
their holdings in Nokia during week t − 1. We also add control variables for
the return on present week (Rett) and the previous week (Rett−1). Lastly, we
include monthly (Mt) and yearly (Yt) dummy variables. The monthly dummies
control for the potential yearly seasonality in the trading (for example, realiz-
ing the losses in December for tax purposes, see e.g. Grinblatt and Keloharju,
2001), and the yearly dummies accommodate the analysis for example to possi-
ble changes due to the abandonment of Nokia’s mobile business (in 2014, Nokia’s
mobile business was acquired by Microsoft, changing the focus of the company
to a telecommunications infrastructure business). To summarize, the regressions
we run are of the following form:
g(Dincreasedt ) = α1 + α2 · FBt + α3 ·NEWSt + α4 · scD
increased
t−1
+α5 ·Rett + α6 · Rett−1 +
11∑
j=1
αj+6 ·Mj +
6∑
j=1
αj+17 · Yj
(1)
where g is the logit function.
4. Results
Panel A in Table 3 shows that for households and nonprofit institutions,
all the regression estimates are statistically significant. The results indicate
that the decisions of investors in these groups to buy vs. sell have a clear
association with the Facebook data. For nonprofit institutions, the economic
significance is relatively high: the odds of a nonprofit institution buying rather
than selling range from 1.111 to 1.212 when the amount of Facebook activity
increases by one standard deviation. For financial institutions, Panel A in Table
3 shows no association between the buy vs. sell decisions and the Facebook data.
The results for companies and governmental institutions are something between
those of financial institutions and households and nonprofit institutions, as half
or less of the estimates are statistically significant.
To take a closer look at the effect of Facebook on the trading of households,
Panel B in Table 3 presents the estimated regression results for individual in-
vestors in different activity groups. We observe that, in general, the more active
a household is, the weaker is the association between Facebook data and buy-
ing/selling behavior. The odds ratios for passive and inactive investors are more
modest than those of nonprofit institutions, though for posts they are still rel-
atively high (1.088 and 1.072). For brevity, we do not report the regression
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estimates for interception and control variables here, but they are available in
Online Appendix. In general, most of the estimates for control variables are
statistically significant.
Table 3: Regression estimates: Trading of investor groups and Facebook data. The
estimates related to Facebook variables of logistic regressions described in Section 3 (Equation
1) for all the investor categories. The dependent variable is a dummy variable getting value
of 1 if an investor increased his/her holdings during the week, and 0 if the investor decreased
the holdings. In addition to the Facebook related variables (for which we report the estimates
here), we control for company annoncement releases, number of previous weeks investors
changing their position (scales), current and previous weeks returns, and in addition we have
monthly and yearly dummies. The regression estimates for control variables (omitted here) are
available in Online Appendix. In Panel B, household investors are categorized into activeness
groups on the basis of their trading in the past eight weeks (40 trading days). Number
of observations (weeks in the analysis) is 341 for all the other regressions, except 332 for
group governmental. p-values are given in parentheses (), and odds ratios (ORs) are given in
curly brackets {}. ORs are calculated on the basis of one standard deviation change in the
explanatory variable.
Panel A: Investor categories
Posts Comments Likes Shares
Companies 0.011 *** 5.55E-06 7.61E-07 ** –6.40E-07
(3.71E-12) (0.098) (6.44E-03) (0.775)
{1.064} {1.016} {1.034} {0.997}
Financial 5.92E-03 1.25E-05 9.42E-07 –1.94E-06
(0.185) (0.197) (0.226) (0.758)
{1.034} {1.036} {1.042} {0.991}
Governmental 0.015 5.45E-05 ** 2.62E-06 2.19E-05
(0.091) (7.20E-03) (0.112) (0.087)
{1.086} {1.165} {1.121} {1.104}
Nonprofit 0.033 *** 3.76E-05 ** 4.43E-06 *** 3.03E-05 **
(2.27E-07) (4.79E-03) (2.23E-04) (1.84E-03)
{1.203} {1.111} {1.212} {1.147}
Households 0.011 *** –4.46E-06 *** 1.92E-07 ** –9.04E-06 ***
(5.74E-83) (7.64E-07) (6.89E-03) (1.23E-41)
{1.064} {0.988} {1.008} {0.960}
Panel B: Activity groups of household investors
Active 2.41E-04 –5.82E-06 –9.74E-07 –1.36E-05 **
(0.942) (0.386) (0.065) (1.32E-03)
{1.001} {0.984} {0.959} {0.940}
Moderate 1.85E-03 4.11E-06 2.67E-07 –1.71E-06
(0.083) (0.071) (0.140) (0.225)
{1.011} {1.012} {1.012} {0.992}
Passive 0.012 *** –9.33E-06 *** –7.33E-07 *** –1.60E-05 ***
(8.55E-55) (2.37E-10) (4.53E-10) (1.73E-49)
{1.072} {0.974} {0.969} {0.930}
Inactive 0.015 *** 1.01E-05 *** 1.84E-06 *** 1.09E-07
(5.12E-67) (5.19E-12) (1.24E-42) (0.911)
{1.088} {1.029} {1.083} {1.000}
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) argue that, roughly speaking, finance and
insurance institutions, as well as companies, can be viewed as the most so-
phisticated investor groups, as they generally take larger positions, have more
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resources to spend on research, and in many cases view investment as full-time
career. In light of this, our findings indicate that more sophisticated investors
are more independent of Facebook activities, as there is clearly no association
between Facebook activities and decisions of financial institutions. Assuming
that an investor’s activeness is related to his/her sophistication, our findings on
household activity groups supports the result that more sophisticated investors
behave more independently of Facebook data.
Facebook can be seen as a secondary information channel compared to first-
hand official company announcements published on the exchange, and com-
panies are likely to strategically select information disseminated in Facebook
(Jung et al., 2017). Nonprofit organizations and households, as arguably less so-
phisticated investors (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000), may allow their trading
decision to be affected by Facebook posts and activity, especially if they have no
access to professional data sources. In line with this view, Ammann and Schaub
(2017) find that the trading decisions of unsophisticated investors are affected
by postings that do not contain value-relevant information on a social trading
platform.
As our question is if the decisions of different investors are associated with
the Facebook data, we are mostly interested in whether the regression estimates
for the Facebook variables are statistically and economically significant, while
the signs of the coefficients are not in the main focus.9 However, a couple of
words about the signs of the estimates in Table 3. In Panel A, the signs for posts,
comments, and likes are consistently positive, except comments for households.
The signs for shares are both positive (governmental and nonprofit) and negative
(companies, financial, households), though not all of them are statistically sig-
nificant, which can explain the variation. Panel B with activity groups reports
positive estimates for posts, but there is more variation for comments, likes,
and shares as passive and inactive investors have negative estimates. Looking
deeper into the reasons of these findings is out of the scope of this paper and
left for the future research, as it would require semantic analysis.10
5. Summary and conclusion
This paper gives the first empirical evidence that Facebook activities af-
fect the trading of different investors differently. We provide evidence that the
decisions of arguably less sophisticated investors—that is, households and non-
profit organizations—to increase or decrease shareholdings are clearly associated
with Facebook data. At the same time, the decisions of financial institutions,
which are likely to be among the most sophisticated investors in the market,
9The number of data points in the regression analysis is 332–341, which does not automat-
ically lead to significant estimates as very large data samples do.
10Additionally, one could consider if observed associations can represent a reverse causality
so that investors are not reacting to social media posts but companies are posting on Facebook
in response to changes in investment behavior. However, the reverse causality seems unlikely,
because the information about numbers of traders changing their position is not public.
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are not associated with Facebook activity. Moreover, less active households’
decisions are related to Facebook, while the decisions of more active ones are
not, which gives additional evidence that the less sophisticated the investor, the
more closely related the behavior is to Facebook. Given that Facebook is not a
regulated information channel compared to first-hand official exchange releases,
companies are likely to strategically select what information to disseminate in
Facebook (Jung et al., 2017). This suggests that less sophisticated investors,
who may not have access to professional sources for financial data and news,
may be driven by biased information.
In the future research we are planning to do sentimental analysis on the
posts and comments to give a more comprehensive picture of the reactions of
different investors to Facebook activities. Concentrating only on Nokia may
introduce some investor clientele bias, since the investors interested in Nokia
may in general be more social media and technology savvy and follow the posts
because of their inclination towards technology. At this point, we were only
able to collect the data for Nokia, but in the future research we are planning to
extend the sample to a wider variety of stocks.
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